Report dell’Ambasciatore Sebastiano Cardi, Rappresentante Permanente d’Italia e Facilitatore per l’implementazione della Risoluzione del Consiglio di Sicurezza 2231 —
Thank you for calling this meeting. My thanks also to Mr. Feltman and Ambassador Joanne Adamson for their briefings.
Today I will touch on three aspects of my report for the 16 June 2017 through 15 December 2017 period: 1. the activities of the Council in the “2231 format”; 2. monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2231; and 3. developments in the procurement channel.
The full version of the report has been circulated to Council members and [has been issued under the symbol S/2017/XXX] OR [will soon be issued as a Security Council document.]
1. The “2231 format.”
On 23 June and 13 December, the Security Council met in the “2231 format” to review the findings and recommendations contained in the third and fourth reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231.
On 14 July, I held an open, technical briefing to inform Member States on the implementation of resolution 2231 and to enhance their
understanding of the opportunities and obligations inherent to it. The Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission and the Secretariat also participated in the briefing.
On 8 September, the Security Council held a meeting in the “2231 format” to discuss the 27 July 2017 “Simorgh Space Launch Vehicle” launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the various letters addressed to the Security Council in this regard. I will summarize our discussion in the second part of my presentation.
2. Monitoring of the implementation of resolution 2231.
In line with paragraph 4 of the resolution, in August and November 2017, the IAEA Director General submitted two quarterly reports on verification and monitoring activities.
In both quarterly reports, the Agency affirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran has not pursued construction of the existing Arak heavy water research reactor based on its original design; has no more than 130 metric tonnes of heavy water; has no more than 5,060 centrifuges that have remained installed in 30 cascades at Natanz; has not enriched uranium above 3.67 per cent U-235; has not conducted any uranium enrichment or related research and development activities at Fordow and that there has not been any nuclear material at the plant.
In its November 2017 report the Agency confirmed that it continued its evaluations regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for the Islamic Republic of Iran, including through the conduct of complementary accesses under the Additional Protocol to all the sites and locations in the Islamic Republic of Iran which it needed to visit.
On 8 September 2017, during a meeting in the “2231 format”, the Security Council considered the “Simorgh Space Launch Vehicle” launch by Iran of 27 July 2017. The meeting’s discussion evinced various views. Some representatives considered the launch inconsistent with resolution 2231 since the technology used was similar to that of a ballistic missile, and the Simorgh, if configured as a missile, was “inherently capable” of delivering nuclear weapons. Other Member States noted that the Simorgh was not designed to and could not be modified to deliver nuclear weapons, and that the language in resolution 2231 contained a “call” to refrain from, but not a “ban” on ballistic activities.
During the reporting period, three Member States sent communications to the Security Council alleging transfer and activities by Iran that fall under the restrictions provided for by resolution 2231. They are listed in detail in my report, together with all replies received from the Iranian Mission to the United Nations.
3. Developments in the procurement channel.
Since Implementation Day, a total of 24 proposals to participate in or permit the activities set forth in paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231, have been submitted to the Security Council by four Member States from three different regional groups, including States that are not participants in the JCPoA. The continuous submission of nuclear-related proposals to the Security Council shows a steady confidence of Member States in the procurement channel. I am also pleased to note that, on average, the proposals were processed through the procurement channel in fewer than 49 days.
On 1 August, the Security Council updated the lists of items, materials, equipment, goods and technology whose supply, sale or transfer to Iran require approval in advance, on a case-by-case basis, by the Security Council, in accordance with paragraph 2 of annex B to resolution 2231.
As we approach two years since Implementation Day, transparency, practical guidance and outreach remain a priority. In this regard, the open briefing for Member States on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) held on 14 July 2017 was one of the many efforts to raise awareness, with a focus on the procurement channel.
Finally, Mr. President, since this is my third and last report on the implementation of resolution 2231 and I am approaching the end of my annual mandate as Security Council Facilitator, allow me to conclude by saying that I am confident that the international community will continue to act in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231, which calls upon all Members States, regional organizations and international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPoA.
Thank you, Mr. President.